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In the planned economy firms were made responsible for providing their workers with 
social services, such as housing, day care and medical care. In the transforming Russia of the 
1990s, social assets were to be transferred from industrial enterprises to the public sector. A 
law on divestment was put into force but it provided mostly general principles. Thus, for a 
period of several years, property rights over a major part of social assets, most notably 
housing, were not properly defined as the transfer decisions were largely left for the local 
level players to make. Strikingly, the time when assets were divested varied considerably 
across firms. In this paper we take a political economy approach and utilize recent survey 
data from 404 medium and large industrial enterprises in 40 Russian regions to study the 
effects different forms of bargaining between the firm and the municipality may have on the 
timing decisions. In particular, we apply survival data analysis to explore the determinants of 
the divestiture timing. Our results show that the firms which divested assets later receive 
more benefits from the local authorities, especially in places where there are more benefits to 
extract (i.e. the local budget is richer). Further, we find evidence that the firms which 
transferred assets later performed relatively worse in 2002 in terms of profitability, 
productivity and investments. Finally, the data shows that poorly defined property rights have 
an adverse effect on the incentives to invest in social assets, and hence on the quality of 
public service provision. 
 
                                                 
1 Helsinki School of Economics (tuuli.juurikkala@hkkk.fi) and Centre for Economic and Financial Research, 
Moscow (olazareva@cefir.ru), respectively. A short version of the paper was presented at the V International 
Scientific Conference “Competitiveness and Modernization of Economy", State University- Higher School of 
Economics, Moscow, April 6-8, 2004. The work reported here is part of the project “Infrastructure and Welfare 
Services in Russia: Enterprises as Beneficiaries and Service Providers” financed by the Academy of Finland 
(project number 200936), the World Bank, and Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation. The project has also received support 
from the Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition. We thank Pertti Haaparanta, Stas Koleinikov 
and Jukka Pirttilä as well as colleagues at CEFIR and SITE for substantial help and guidance. Special thanks to 
Alexei Makrushin for help with municipal data. All errors are our own.  2
1. Introduction 
 
Of the reforms that Russia has undergone during transition period the 
municipalization of social assets has been perhaps undeservedly neglected in the past few 
years. By the end of the Soviet times some 40% of total housing stock existed within 
industrial enterprises. The situation was similar with day care, medical care, recreation 
facilities and other social assets.
2 Despite formally belonging to the state, these assets were in 
practice operated by firms and to this extent were in firms’ ownership, de facto if not de jure.  
From the beginning of the 1990’s, the Russian Federation government is three-tiered 
with federal, regional and municipal layers. In principle, the social service provision is 
delegated to the local level. During the mass privatization of industrial enterprises (1991-
1994) major part of social assets operated by enterprises should have been transferred to 
municipal ownership. The institution of municipal ownership itself was created at the same 
time. Federal legislation on the municipalization of social assets provided just general 
principles and a lot was left for the local authorities to decide. Thus, for a period of several 
years, property rights over major part of social assets, most notably housing, were not 
properly defined. Previous literature emphasizes the importance of property rights for 
economic development and growth (Libecap 1989, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1993). 
In this paper we use the data from a recent survey of 404 medium and large Russian 
industrial enterprises to study the transfer of property rights over social assets from firms to 
municipalities. The data shows that there is large variation between the firms in the timing of 
the transfer to municipality as it started already in 1991 and for some firms may still have 
continued in 2003 and beyond. According to the survey results, even within just one 
municipality, the time of divestment may vary considerably. We apply survival data analysis 
(see Lancaster 1990) to explore the factors affecting the timing of divestiture.  
 The focus of our analysis is on the political economy of reform, in particular, on the 
relations between the firms and municipalities. In the transition environment firms and local 
authorities are often involved in bilateral bargain over the distribution of benefits, such as 
budget subsidies and tax cuts. (Shleifer and Vishny 1994, Sonin 2003, Slinko, Yakovlev and 
Zhuravskaya 2003). We argue that the timing of the divestiture of social assets in part may 
depend on the ability of firms to use the assets as leverage in their bargaining with 
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municipalities. We focus on the firms’ side of this interaction. Namely, we study the 
incentives the firm has for keeping social assets longer or divesting of them fast. 
The counterpart of the firm in bargaining is thus municipality or, in practice, the local 
politicians and civil servants. The politicians have an interest in political support, which in 
turn can be boosted by high quality of social service provision. Social assets are, however, a 
financial burden to the municipality just as they are to the firm because this sector was and 
still is heavily subsidized
3. Besides political support, the local authorities in general are 
interested in private benefits, such as tax revenues diversion and bribe extraction through 
excessive regulation. 
The rents the firms and municipalities may bargain over consist of, for example, firm 
profits, firm survival, public sector budget flows, and political support. Rents can also be 
interpreted as minimizing costs, in this case the costs of running the social assets. Both 
parties, the firm and the municipality, use whatever weapons they have. Municipality uses 
both carrot and stick – benefits and harassment, the firm uses bribes, favors or threats – 
shedding of extra labor or even shutting down altogether, or abandoning of assets. Although 
there are examples of firms and municipalities achieving formal agreements over the use and 
joint financing of social assets, a significant share of these issues has been governed by 
informal relations. 
Altogether, the bargaining process may be inefficient and divert resources from better 
uses. That is why we are interested in the effect the asset divestiture process has on firm 
performance and restructuring. There is a vast amount of empirical studies on the 
determinants of firm performance in transition economies (Brown and Earle 2000, Angelucci 
et al. 2002, Carlin et al. 2003 to name a few). We contribute to this literature by looking at 
the effect the social assets inherited from the Soviet period have on firm performance and 
restructuring. We also look at how competitive pressure from the product and labor markets 
alters the firms’ incentives related to the timing of divestiture. In a broader sense, it is not 
only an issue of firm performance but also of the efficiency of public service provision. We 
argue that poorly defined property rights have an adverse effect on the incentives to invest in 
social assets. 
Our results show that the firms which divested assets later receive more benefits from 
the local authorities, especially in places where there are more rents to extract (i.e. the local 
budget is richer). At the same time, we also find that the firms facing more competition in the 
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product markets divested later, which could indicate that social assets are used to lobby for 
protection by the authorities against competition. Further, we find evidence that the firms 
which transferred assets later performed relatively worse in 2002 in terms of profitability, 
productivity and investments. Finally, our data shows that poorly defined property rights have 
an adverse effect on the incentives to invest in social assets, and hence, on the quality of 
public service provision. 
In the following, we first describe the social asset divestment process in Russia in 
general and touch briefly upon the current state of social service provision according to 
survey results. We then proceed to draw the hypotheses to be tested from previous literature. 
Finally, we present empirical analysis of the determinants of divestment timing and the 
effects it had on firm performance. Last section concludes. 
 
2.  Social asset divestment in the 1990s 
4 
 
In the end of the Soviet period, a considerable amount of housing and other social 
assets were within industrial enterprises. After the efforts to transfer these assets from the 
firms to the public sector in the mid 1990s, this phenomenon has not received much attention. 
Our survey results, however, show that the large industrial firms still provide a wide array of 
social services or finance them despite having divested of them.
5 There are also substantial 
differences across the interviewed firms and different types of assets in how fast and to what 
extent divestiture has taken place. Furthermore, many of the firms have no intention of 
divesting all their assets; rather, they intend to invest in the package of fringe benefits they 
provide to their employees (and in many cases also to users outside the firm). In this section 
we review the divestiture process of social assets in Russia. We also describe briefly the 
current status of service provision by firms and the actual outcomes of the divestment process 
based on our survey results. 
 
2.1 Divestment process in the literature 
 
  According to Leksin and Shvetsov (1998, 1999), in 1992, one third of the total 
housing stock in Russia was privately owned (mostly individual houses). The rest was 
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considered public housing and included municipal housing and departmental 
(vedomstvennoe) housing that existed within enterprises. A substantial part of the state-owned 
housing existed within the enterprises. In 1994, one third of the firms with fewer than 500 
employees provided housing, the share increasing to 100% for enterprises with more than 10 
000 employees. In the beginning of the 1990’s, some 70% of large and medium-sized 
enterprises offered medical services while over 75% of large and 50% of medium-sized 
enterprises had day care. Though the privatization law allowed privatization of both 
municipal and departmental housing, according to some evidence firms were reluctant to let 
their workers privatize apartments in houses under their control. By the end of 1993, only 
20% of these apartments were privatized as opposed to close to 40% in municipal housing 
(see Stryk and Kosareva, 1994).  
Commander and Schankerman (1997) report that by 1994 firms had reduced their 
social assets but approximately a third of them still provided services at a level comparable to 
the pre-transition level. Interestingly, new firms also provided services. Privatized and state-
owned companies were similar in terms of scope of provision. Larger firms were less likely 
to reduce the number of benefits.
6 
By 1998, practically in all Russian regions social infrastructure within the firms had 
already long ago become semi-municipal (Leksin and Shvetsov, 1998). Up to 50% of those 
who used these social services were not employees of that enterprise. Thus, firms financed 
municipal social infrastructure. 
Basic legal documents requiring divestiture of housing and the main part of social 
assets within 6 months after the enterprise was privatized were adopted in 1992-1993. A 
gradualist approach was taken in the sense that instead of immediate privatization, the assets 
were to be divested to the local authorities, which were made responsible for the provision of 
the services.
7 
The transfer of social assets was supposed to be done by the end of 1997 and indeed 
the majority of assets were transferred. Roughly 80% of the housing stock, medical services, 
day care, sports facilities and children’s summer camps, as well as 60 -70% of recreation 
facilities became municipal during 1993-1997. The variation between regions, and especially 
between municipalities, was, however, very large, as the share of municipalized assets might 
vary between 15% and 100%. 
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According to Starodubrovskaya (2002), more than 90% of enterprise housing and 
other social assets had been accepted to municipal ownership at the time of writing. The 
author accredits the success in asset transfer to a large extent to the 1.5% turnover tax 
introduced in 1995-1996 to finance housing and social facilities. As long as enterprises 
continued to hold the social assets on their balance, they could deduct their social 
expenditures from this tax. Before its abolishment in the 2000 tax reform, it created a 
mechanism allowing municipalities to receive additional funding after transfer with no 
mediation of the regional or federal governments, and was actually the “only serious local tax 
in the Russian tax system”. After the tax reform, federal subsidies remained the only source 
of financial compensation for housing accepted in the ownership of municipalities. 
Municipalities could also make formal agreements with firms for joint financing of 
transferred assets. 
Again, the pace of divestiture of housing in different locations varied considerably. 
Starodubrovskaya (2001, 2002) argues that this is a result of complex relationships and 
incentive structures between the main players- enterprise management, local and regional 
governments, sometimes trade unions, and different groups of population. 
 
2.2 Survey results 
 
In our survey data, over 90% of the firms had at least some kind of social assets in 
1990, and over 90% still provided or supported at least one service in 2003, though the scale 
of the firms’ participation in social service provision has diminished significantly during the 
last decade
8 (see Table 1). Both the speed and the scope of divestiture differ by the type of 
asset and by locality. While managers view the social service provision as non-essential and 
costly, many of the firms still provide these services, even to users other than their own 
workforce. In general, there has been a switch from keeping assets to other forms of support, 
such as direct subsidies to the employees. Larger firms, as measured by employment, are 
more likely to have social assets left and bear higher costs, relative to the wage bill. Also, 
general managers of the larger firms are less eager to divest of their current social assets than 
the managers of firms with fewer than 500 employees. Furthermore, the firms that in 2003 
had housing built after 1990 were approximately twice as large as those that did not have new 
housing. 
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In 1990, almost 80% of the 404 surveyed firms provided housing to their employees. 
Of those that did, close to 60% have since then fully divested of it, and almost all have 
divested either fully or partially.
9 In most cases, divestment has occurred to the municipality, 
but in more than 20% of the firms that kept housing in 1990, apartments have been sold to 
other parties, at least partially. In the spring of 2003, over half of the surveyed social 
managers reported that their respective firms still owned housing or provided housing support 
in some other form, mostly through direct subsidies. It is also striking that in over a half of 
the firms that offer this benefit, users are not just employees and their families. Over 60% of 
the firms reported that the people living in the apartments cover some part of the costs. 
Surprisingly many firms, 15%, had assets that were built after 1990. 
Similarly to housing close to 80% of firms provided medical care in 1990.
 However, 
only slightly more than 20% had divested of it fully, and over 90% continued providing 
support for medical services in some form in 2003. Two thirds of all surveyed companies still 
own these assets, mostly in the form of having a so-called medpunkt on site
10. 
Approximately 90% of the firms report having divested of day care, fully or partially. 
The divestment occurred almost solely to the municipality. About 90% report full divestiture 
of day care, compared to 60% in the case of housing. Just a few have built any new facilities 
since 1990, and only one fourth provided support for day care in any form in 2003, the 
service thus losing relative importance in the social benefit package the firms offer their 
employees, in part because of demographic changes and a lower demand for the service. 
Majority of day care facilities were divested in the middle of 1990s while housing 
divestment has continued quite actively to this date. Figure 1 shows the annual number of 
firms that carried out their last divestment of certain assets between 1990 and 2003.
11 Only a 
few firms have divested of medical facilities in general. The average firm in the sample had 
divested of 75% of its housing and 86% of its day care capacity by 2003. 
When asked about the main reasons for the divestments that took place during the last 
three years, a clear majority of the general managers said that the assets were an excessive 
burden to the firm. Of the firms, which provided certain services in 2003, less than 5% of 
general managers per asset deemed them profitable. As Table 1 shows, the majority of those 
that had housing left wanted to divest of it, and approximately a half of those few that still 
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provided day care wanted to divest of that asset as well. Only a handful had the opportunity 
to sell the assets profitably, whereas many – about one third for housing, medical care, and 
day care - had just been waiting for the time when the municipality would finally accept the 
assets. Many managers still think the relations to municipality would worsen should the firm 
sell the assets. More than one third of those who would like to divest their housing and day 
care faced legal or administrative barriers to selling them. Interestingly, the groups of firms 
that, on the one hand wanted to divest of their assets, and, on the other hand, faced legal or 
administrative barriers to selling them, did not completely overlap, meaning that a relatively 




We next formulate predictions about the determinants of social asset divestment 
timing and the effects the divestment has had on firm performance. We focus on the decision 
of the firm to divest or to keep social assets, property rights over which are not properly 
defined. Poorly defined property rights create possibilities for bargaining over benefits for 
both the firms and local authorities, which may result in suboptimal distribution of resources 
and may thus deter growth (see Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1993).  
 
3.1 Special treatment of the firms by the public sector.  
 
Why would a municipality want firms to provide social services, that is, to postpone 
divestment? Obviously, this is a way to shift costs of keeping services to the firms. Besides, it 
is an instrument to divert tax revenues from upper-level budgets when fiscal incentives of 
municipalities are weak (incentives of local authorities are modeled elsewhere, see 
Zhuravskaya 2000, Haaparanta and Juurikkala 2004, Sonin 2003; see also Shleifer and 
Treisman 2000).  
Of course, keeping social assets comes with a cost for the firms. This leads us to our 
first testable hypothesis: The higher the social costs, the more the firm would like to get rid of 
the social assets.  
  Why would the firms then agree to keep social assets? One reason is that the firms can 
extract rents from the municipality in exchange for providing the services. Rents may come 
in a form of tax reductions, tax arrears, budget subsidies, better access to supplies, selling  9
products at non-market prices and other preferential treatments. We thus hypothesize that the 
firms that keep social assets longer receive more budget assistance and have in general closer 
ties to the public sector than those that have divested of them already.  
Furthermore, the richer and/or more independent financially the municipality, the 
more resources there is to divide. In the Russian system of fiscal federalism the revenues in 
municipal budgets consist of own tax and non-tax revenues, pre-defined share of tax revenues 
that are split between the three levels of government, and various kinds of transfers from the 
upper level budgets. Although having higher own incomes does not necessarily mean that the 
municipality is richer as fiscal incentives are generally weak (Zhuravskaya 2000), 
municipalities with higher own budget income share should have more discretion over their 
spending. Also Sonin (2003) argues that in the regions with a high share of productive 
enterprises, that is, a wide own tax base, governor of the region can protect enterprises from 
paying federal taxes in return for bribes or other concessions from the firms. Same logic can 
be applied to the local level. Our expectation would thus be that in municipalities with higher 
share of own budget revenues, firms keep social assets longer. Or, more generally, in the 
municipalities where there are more rents to extract, the firms bargain for keeping the assets 
longer.  
Apart from “bribing” the firm with subsidies and tax cuts, local authorities can also 
harass the firm through various regulatory agencies to make it keep assets. In other words, the 
authorities can apply a kind of a carrot and stick policy. Consequently, we test whether the 
firms that divest later have to spend more time dealing with the public sector. 
Finally, the interaction of the firm with the municipality over social assets depends 
largely on the bargaining power of the firm, which is manifested in its ability to capture the 
state, i.e. influence the public decision-making. The bargaining power of the firm can be used 
in two opposite ways – to push for faster transfer of assets or to extract rents in return for 
keeping assets longer. We test also the effect of other possible sources of bargaining power 
such as a dominant position in the local labor market or being a major tax payer in the 
community on divestment timing. 
 
3.2 Labor and product market pressure  
 
Another reason for a firm to keep assets is the benefits it can have through providing 
some of the employees’ compensation in the form of social services. This may help to reduce 
the wage bill, attach workers (see Guriev and Friebel 2002) and/or attract new workers in a  10
tight labor market. The size of this benefit for a firm will depend on the quality of assets it 
has, for instance whether they are old or new, costs of running the assets, share of outside 
users of assets and the availability of social services outside the firm, in the locality. We test 
whether concentration in the local labor market postpones divestment. 
  As the main object of our analysis is the firm and its incentives, we also want to 
investigate how product market competition enters into this picture. Do competitive forces 
make firms to get rid of assets faster? One would think that under high competitive pressure 
firms would try to cut their non-productive costs by divesting of assets faster. On the other 
hand, if the potential for rent extraction is high then firms facing tough competition would try 
to cushion themselves from competition by keeping assets and extracting budget assistance in 
return.  
 
3.3 Performance effects 
 
Finally, we study how the heritage of Soviet times in a form of social assets affected 
firm performance and restructuring during the transition period. On the one hand, firms that 
had more assets and divested later were bearing more costs. On the other hand, firms keeping 
assets longer could have extracted more benefits from public sector and could have saved 
more on labor costs. Thus, the effect of old social assets divestiture on performance is 
ambiguous.  
Another important indicator of firm restructuring is labor shedding. It is known that 
during transition the industrial employment has fallen much less than industrial output and 
many firms have been hoarding unproductive labor. Even in 2003 more than 40% of the firms 
in our sample admit that they would like to cut their employment.  
It is not only the problem of firm performance that should be addressed in relation to 
social service provision by the firms, but it is also a question of efficient public service 
provision that is at stake. Incentives for efficient service provision are weakened by the fact 
that as a firm does not own the assets it inherited, it will have to give up the assets but it is not 
clearly determined when and how this should happen. The situation is similar to the tragedy 
of commons: poorly defined property rights over an asset should result in its over-
exploitation and under-investment (Libecap 1989). 
We next turn to the survey evidence on divestment timing and subsequent firm 
performance. 
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4.  Evidence on divestment timing and performance effects 
 
4.1 Data and methodology 
 
In this section we analyze the determinants of social asset divestment timing and the 
effect it has had on firm performance through survey data from 404 middle and large 
industrial enterprises, measured by employment, in 40 regions of Russia in 2003. In addition 
we utilize Goskomstat enterprise registry data as well as selected information on the 
municipalities the firms are located in.
12 Most of the analysis both on factors of divestment 
and on performance effects is on housing as it is by far the largest and most important social 
asset, which firms were obliged to transfer. 
In the first part of the following empirical analysis of the determinants of housing 
transfer timing, we take a survival data approach (see Lancaster, 1990). Survival analysis is 
used for analyzing the time until some event occurs. It models the risk of change of the state 
the object is currently in. The reason OLS is mostly not applicable in this kind of analysis is 
that it assumes normal distribution of residuals, which is in many cases unreasonable with 
respect to time. We want to answer the question how quickly the enterprises will transfer 
their housing to the municipality, or more precisely, what is the probability that this happens 
in the next interval in time, in our case a year, given that the firm has kept the housing (i.e. 
remained in its original state) thus far.  
Parametric models of survival analysis use different assumptions of the residual 
distribution. In contrast, semiparametric models do not make any assumptions of distribution 
of event time, though they still parameterize the effect of regressors. Thus, these models are 
more suitable for changing circumstances such as the economic and regulatory environment 
during transition.  
We utilize the Cox proportional hazards model, which is a semi parametric estimator. 
In our case, we thus do not make any parametric assumptions as to how exactly the pressure 
to transfer the assets was changing over time. This method also accounts for the censoring 
problem, i.e. the fact that some firms still had housing left in 2003 and we do not know when 
the change is going to happen. 
In the core of survival analysis is the hazard function, which measures the risk of (or 
the contemporaneous probability of) change of the state the object is currently in: 
                                                 











The resulting coefficients are thus hazard ratios (exponentiated coefficients from the model), 
which measure the risk of divestment. E.g. hazard ratio of 1.2 indicates that a one-unit change 
of the variable increases the risk of divestment by 20%, that is, leads to faster divestment. 
In the second part of our analysis we test with OLS and Probit the effects the amount 
of assets and divestment timing have had on the firms’ performance, measured by 
profitability, labor productivity and investment.  
 
4.2 Determinants of divestment of social assets  
 
As the property rights over social assets were poorly defined in the first place, we 
would expect both the municipality and the firm to minimize their costs from the social assets 
within the loose framework set in the law on divestment. We find that the higher the size of 
housing per employee in 1990, the faster the firm divested of it (see Table 2)
 13. The amount 
of housing a firm had also represents its threat point whereby in the worst case the firm could 
simply abandon its assets, as anecdotal evidence indeed suggests was possible. For the firm 
then to keep the assets voluntarily there should be special incentives or pressure from the 
public sector or other sources. In support of the first of these hypotheses, we find that the 
firms which transferred housing to the municipality late or still continue to keep it, also 
receive more budget assistance, such as subsidized credits, tax benefits and direct subsidies, 
and have higher share of sales to state. The firms with a higher share of municipal ownership 
also divested later while the total share of state ownership as well as insider ownership do not 
have an effect on housing divestiture (see Table 2, columns 1-3). On the pressure side, local 
authorities can also harass the firm through various regulatory agencies to make it keep 
assets. We find that the firms that divested later or did not divest yet also spend more time 
with regulatory agencies (Table 2, column 4). 
The extent of lobbying and bargaining by the firms depends also on the amount of 
resources available, in particular, the share of own tax and non-tax revenues the municipality 
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can collect. We assume here that the municipalities with a higher own income share have 
more discretion over their spending, and thus can provide more preferential treatments. 
Indeed, we find that in the municipalities with a higher share of own budget revenues the 
firms kept housing for a longer time (Table 2, column 5)
14. The same effect is found for day 
care.   
Quite naturally, the bargaining power of the firm affects the bargaining outcome. We 
asked the firms directly whether they can influence the laws and regulations adopted at the 
local, regional or national level
15. We argue that in the municipalities where there are more 
rents to extract, measured by the share of own revenues in the total budget incomes, the firms 
would bargain for keeping the assets longer. Indeed, the data shows that the ability of the firm 
to influence municipal or regional authorities is not significant per se, but in those 
municipalities where the share of own budget revenues is high this ability results in later 
divestment (Table 2, column 6 and Table 3). 
An alternative measure of a firm’s bargaining power is its relative importance for the 
municipality. We measure this by the tax share of the firm in the total municipal budget 
incomes. When including this variable into regression analysis, the share of own municipal 
budget incomes becomes insignificant while the share of taxes of a particular firm in the 
municipal budget is highly negatively significant , i.e. it causes faster divestment. Thus, being 
a major tax payer in a locality has a countervailing effect to the share of own budget incomes 
in the municipality. A possible interpretation is that when one firm provides a large part of 
the tax revenues in the municipal budget, there are fewer resources to be transferred to this 
firm from other taxpayers. In other words, it is more difficult for the local authorities to favor 
a major tax payer at the expense of the other firms. It is also difficult to provide high tax 
reductions to a major taxpayer as the municipality will be left with much lesser incomes. 
Based on these results we can distinguish between three groups of firms in terms of 
the share of their taxes in total municipal budget incomes, the share of own revenues in the 
municipal budget, and the size of the locality
16. A firm of the first type would be located in 
large municipality with a high own budget income share with the share of this firm in the 
local industry and local budget being small. These are likely to be firms in big industrial 
cities. For them the time of housing divestment is the longest. A firm of the second type 
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would be located in somewhat smaller municipality with medium own budget income but it 
would have a larger share in the local industrial employment and budget. These would be 
smaller regional centers. Such firms are less able to get preferential treatments and the time of 
divestment for them is shorter. Firms of the third type are located in small municipalities with 
low own budget incomes and play an important role in the locality. The so-called monotowns 
– towns dominated by one large industrial firm – are likely to fall into this group. For them it 
is easier to pressure the municipality to accept social assets but harder to get benefits as the 
budget is poor. Hence their divestiture is the fastest. 
Consequently, while in 1990 the firms in larger municipalities, measured by 
population size, were less likely to have housing (bigger cities had a higher share of 
municipal housing), by 2003 this relationship reversed: firms in larger municipalities were 
more likely to have housing.  
Labor and product market forces may also influence the outcome of bargaining 
between the firm and the municipality. Our data shows that in regions with more active 
housing market measured by the growth of housing per capita from 1990 to 2001 and size of 
housing per capita in 2001, firms divested housing earlier. To support our view that firms do 
get benefits from providing social assets to employees, as mentioned in the previous section, 
there is evidence that in the early 1990s firms were opposing privatization of apartments in 
“their” houses. However, we do not find that the concentration in the local labor market per 
se or the tightness of the labor market, measured by estimated time needed to find new 
employees, would have an effect on the timing of divestiture (Table 2, column 10)
17. The 
share of the firm’s employment in the municipal industrial employment has a significant 
negative effect on the timing of divestiture but this variable is highly correlated with the tax 
share of the firm. The share of the firm’s employment in the working-age population of 
municipality is again insignificant. 
Do competitive forces in the product market make firms to get rid of assets faster? 
Rather counterintuitively, we find that the firms which operated in less competitive markets 
(measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman index in 1990) actually divested housing faster (Table 2, 
column 9)
18. This seemingly surprising result may have the following explanation: if the 
potential for rent extraction is high then firms facing tough competition would try to cushion 
                                                 
17 Nevertheless, concentration has a strong positive effect on the probability of having or supporting housing in 
2003; also, firms that face more concentrated labor markets are less willing to get rid of housing now. See a 
companion paper by Haaparanta and Juurikkala (2004) 
18 As a robustness check we use another measure of industry level concentration – the share of the two largest 
firms in the industry. This measure has the same effect as HHI.  15
themselves from competition by keeping assets and extracting budget assistance in return. 
Indeed, we find that in municipalities with a low own budget income share, industry 
concentration is not significant while in municipalities with high own income share, the effect 
of concentration is to reduce the time of divestiture considerably (Table 3). Also in support of 
this hypothesis we find significant interactions between some measures of competition and 
state capture (ability to influence laws and regulations): among the firms that have an ability 
to capture the authorities, the firms in more competitive markets will keep assets longer. 
 
4.3 Social assets and firm performance 
 
Finally, we analyze the restructuring and performance effects of divestment timing. 
Here as well as in previous analysis we look mostly at housing as it is the single most 
important part of the firms’ social assets.  
To capture the effect of both the size of housing the firm had in the beginning of the 
1990s and the timing of divestiture, we take the number of square meters of housing the firm 
had in 1990 per employee
19 and weight it by the time when it divested all or most of its 
housing. Thus, we assume that providing housing extensively in the beginning and divesting 
of it fast has the same effect as having less housing initially but keeping it longer – in the first 
case firm bears high costs for a short period of time, in the second case – smaller costs but for 
a longer period.
20 
The measures of firm performance available to us are profitability, labor productivity 
and investments. Figures for sales, profits and employment are mostly taken from the registry 
of Russian industrial enterprises (Goskomstat data), while data on investments come from our 
survey. Profitability and labor productivity are measured both in absolute values and relative 
to 5-digit industry medians; labor productivity is always in logs. As the results in Table 4 
show, by almost any measure of firm performance, weighted housing has significant negative 
effect on performance. Firms that had more housing per employee in 1990 and/or divested of 
it later performed worse in terms of their profitability and labor productivity, relative to other 
firms in the sample and to the industry median. Firms over-burdened with housing for a 
longer time were also less likely to make investments in the last three years, especially to 
invest into the expansion of existing production or production of new products. Thus, high 
                                                 
19 We use the employment figure for 1998 as figures for earlier years have much fewer observations; number of 
employees in 1990 and 1998 are correlated at 92 percent in our sample.  
20 In the analysis of this section, we include also those firms which did not have housing in 1990  16
burden of housing and its late divestment hinder the current performance of a firm and its 
ability to invest. We can say that the firms, which were involved in some private dealings 
with the municipality over social assets, delayed restructuring as they could 
survive with inefficient production due to support from the municipality 
and thus performed worse
21.  
Regarding potential labor shedding, if we look at the change in the firms’ employment 
in the year following housing divestment, the firms that divested reduced their employment 
more than the firms that had housing and did not divest in the same year, though the 
difference is not statistically significant. Also, the percentage change in employment from 
1990 to 2001 is positively correlated with the time of transfer of housing – the later the firm 
divested of housing the more it increased (the less it decreased) its number of employees. 
Finally, the firms that divested of housing before 1995 on average reduced number of 
employees from 1995 to 2001 (mean reduction 7.6%, median 5.6%) while the firms that 
divested of housing after 2000 or still keep it on average increased number of employees 
during the same period (mean increase 3.2%, median 4.7%). As these results show, the firms 
that already divested of their housing were more willing to cut employment. 
Poorly defined property rights over an asset should result in its over-exploitation and 
under-investment. Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that some firms ran housing for several 
years without investing in it and then transferred it to the municipality in very poor condition. 
In our data we also find evidence of this kind of distorted incentives. Among firms that 
divested most of their housing, many still have some housing left and they apparently 
consider these leftovers as their property
22. Among the firms that divested most of their 
housing before 2000 and still have something left, 63% made investments in housing in the 
last three years. Of all the firms that divested housing after 2000 or did not divest at all, only 
34% made investments in housing in the last three years. In terms of size of investment per 
square meter of housing, the firms that divested most of their housing before 2000 (2001, 
2002) also invested more than the firms that divested on or after this date (the difference is 
statistically significant). Finally, the firms that divested of part or all of their housing build 
new housing much more: 45% of firms that divested of old housing at some point built or 
bought new housing after 1990 compared to only 22% of firms that did not divest their old 
housing to the date. 
                                                 
21 Of course, there is an issue of causality here. It may well be that worse performing (=less efficient) firms were 
reluctant to divest assets in order to be able to bargain for budget subsidies or other preferential treatments. 
22 To support this view, among the firms in which managers answer that they don’t want to get rid of their 




Industrial restructuring in Russia is definitely a complex issue. In this paper we do not 
limit our analysis to restructuring but take a political economy approach to the divestment 
process of enterprise social assets to municipalities in the last decade or so. We argue that 
under poorly defined property rights, bargaining between the firms and the local authorities 
over costs and benefits from service provision drives the divestment process.  
The rents the firms and the municipalities may bargain over mainly consist of firm 
profits and public sector budget flows, but also firm survival and political support. 
Bargaining is aggravated by the fact that social assets present a financial burden both to the 
firms and municipalities due to the social service sector being heavily subsidized. The firm 
and the municipality employ various bargaining instruments: municipality uses both carrot 
and stick – preferential treatments and harassment, the firm uses bribes, favors or threats, 
such as  shedding of extra labor or even shutting down altogether, or abandoning of assets. 
Although there are examples of firms and municipalities achieving formal agreements over 
the use and joint financing of social assets, a significant share of these issues has been 
governed by informal relations.  
We utilize a recent survey of 404 firms in 40 regions to study the determinants of the 
divestment timing decision and the effects it has had on firm performance. Our results show 
that the firms which divested assets later receive more benefits from the local authorities, 
especially in places where there are more rents to extract (i.e. the local budget is richer). At 
the same time, firms that play an important role in the locality in terms of tax payments and 
employment divest of assets faster as they are in a better position to push municipality to 
accept assets, but are at the same time able to squeeze less benefits from the municipal budget 
at the expense of other firms.  
We also find that the firms facing more competition in the product markets divested 
later, which could indicate that social assets are used to lobby for protection by the authorities 
against competition. Further, we find evidence that the firms which transferred assets later 
performed relatively worse in 2002 in terms of profitability, productivity and investments. 
Finally, our data shows that poorly defined property rights have an adverse effect on the 
incentives to invest in social assets, and hence, on the quality of public service provision.  18
Given the essence of both a competitive private sector and the quality of public 
services for sustainable development and growth, our findings point out that attention should 
be given to institutional aspects when designing economic reforms. 
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Table 1 Social asset provision: information from firm survey 
 
How many firms, % of 




Had  in  1990  78.5 76.7 69.8 38.2 
      
Have  in  2003  39.5 78.5 11.9 25.9 
Spent money on municipal 
assets in 2002 
11.6 15.4 16.6 5.7 
      
Of those who have:      
Deem  it  profitable  1.9 1.3 2.1 4.8 
Want to get rid of (sell or 
transfer) 
70.7 12.4 46.8 29.4 
Of those who want to get 
rid of: 
    
Local authorities would 
agree to accept 
42.7 35.9 63.6 40.0 
Have legal or admin. 
barriers to selling 
38.9 35.9 31.8 23.3 
 
 Table 2. Cox proportional hazard model for the factors determining housing divestment timing 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Log_emp1998  0.880 0.916 0.924 0.932 0.929 0.937 0.947   0.924 0.961 
  (0.082) (0.084) (0.085) (0.074) (0.070) (0.072) (0.082)   (0.071) (0.073) 
Hous1990_per_employee 1.020***  1.019*** 1.020*** 1.023*** 1.019*** 1.019*** 1.019  1.020*** 1.023**  1.023***
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) 
budget_assist  0.779*  0.798  0.780*  0.823        
  (0.114)  (0.117)  (0.114)  (0.115)        
state_sales2000  0.565**  0.596*  0.575**  0.541***       
  (0.146)  (0.158)  (0.143)  (0.129)        
Munic_ownership  0.146*           
  ( 0 . 1 6 2 )            
state_ownership   0.740          
   (0.236)          
i n s i d e _ o w n e r s h i p     1 . 3 2 8          
    (0.274)         
Regulation_burden     0.986***       
     ( 0 . 0 0 5 )         
Own_budget_income_share1999      0.311**  0.291**  0.346     
      (0.179)  (0.172)  (0.235)     
S t a t e _ c a p t u r e        0 . 8 6 2       
       (0.115)      
Tax_share        2.769***    
        (0.826)     
Empl_share1998         1.805*    
         ( 0 . 5 9 5 )     
HHI1990          3.201***  
          ( 1 . 3 9 9 )    
HHI_labor_market1992          1.043 
           (0.548) 
Observations  208 210 209 236 231 224 181 208 236 240 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; industry dummies included; hazard ratios instead of coefficients reported 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
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Table 3. The effects of high own budget income 
 
  Low own budget income 
share* 
High own budget 
income share  
State_capture 0.961  0.569** 
 (0.145)  (0.150) 
Observations 167  78 
HHI90 1.948  8.285*** 
 (1.011)  (5.054) 
Observations 162  74 
 
Coefficients from Cox regression (as in Table 2) for subsamples, controlling for size, industry and housing per employee, robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
 
*Less than 40 percent which is 75



















Table 4 The effect of housing transfer time on firm performance, OLS and Probit 
 































in last three 
years
2 
log_emp1998  -0.550 -1.568 -0.639   -0.012 -0.069 0.036  0.045 
  (0.784) (1.011) (0.790)   (0.062) (0.054) (0.029) (0.039) 
Industry  dummies  + + -  + + -  + + 
          
Hous1990_per_emploee_weighted  -0.294  -0.522*** -0.490*** -0.038*** -0.027**  -0.029**  -0.016*** -0.023*** 
  (0.249) (0.158) (0.138) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.005) (0.009) 
log_capital_emp2001    0.299***      
     (0.053)      
Constant 15.205***  21.118***  9.080*  4.178***  0.653  0.928**     
  (5.546) (7.108) (5.334) (0.283) (0.449) (0.368)    
Observations  282 315 315 324 317 317 329 325 
R-squared  0.04 0.08 0.02 0.36 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.05 
 
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses              
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
Notes:         
1 Data from the survey, rest of regressions – data from Goskomstat registry; in profitability variables in (1)-(3) outliers are removed (one percentile at both tails of 
distribution) 
2 Probit regressions, marginal effects instead of coefficients reported 




In spite of the obvious importance of large scale transfer of social assets kept by 
enterprises under ownership of municipalities, there was never a federal law regulating this 
process. Instead, the reform was regulated by series of legal acts, enactments, decrees etc at 
all levels of government.  Many important acts were introduced with delays, sometimes only 
several years after the start of actual process of transfer, when the most acute problems had 
surfaced. 
The formation of municipal ownership over social and infrastructure assets started 
before mass privatization in 1991-1992. Enactment by Higher Council of Russian Federation 
№ 3020-1 on December 27, 1991 established the division of state ownership into federal 
ownership, ownership of subjects of federation and municipal ownership. This act defined the 
categories of assets which should be transferred into municipal ownership irrespective of who 
owned them or had them on their balance previously. They were: 
•  housing and other buildings 
•  enterprises servicing housing and other social assets 
•  infrastructure objects, city transport etc 
 
Another  Enactment by President № 114-RP on March 18, 1992 established the 
procedures for the transfer of social and infrastructure assets, according to which municipal 
level property committee compiled the list of objects to be included into municipal ownership 
and higher level government confirmed the list. 
As for the social assets held by enterprises, enterprises never owned them during 
soviet time as all assets were state owned, but they kept assets on their balance sheet. With 
the start of mass privatization of the enterprises these assets should have been either 
privatized or transferred to municipality. Presidential Decree № 8 on January 10, 1993 
defined the list of objects which could be included into the list of privatized assets of the firm 
with the requirement of keeping their profile. These included social and cultural objects 
(health, education, culture and sports facilities), consumer services (laundry, hairdressers 
etc.). At the same time Decree defined list of assets that could not be privatized by firms: 
•  Buildings occupied by trading, catering, consumer services 
establishments, organizations of social security for children, elderly and disabled 
•  Daycare and summer children’s’ facilities 
•  Regional transport and electricity infrastructure 
•  Medical facilities servicing population of the city/region 
•  Housing and related service facilities 
 
All these assets were defined to be under federal state ownership and should have 
been transferred to municipal ownership. Further, several legal acts of State Property 
Committee were issued to clarify the procedures for transferring the assets listed above from 
firms to municipalities (again, municipalities were responsible for compiling the list of 
objects to be transferred to municipal ownership). The Decree and further acts also provided 
for a possibility for agreements between municipality and a firm about joint usage and 
financing of transferred assets. There were also other provisions for the ways to finance 
transferred objects. The State Privatization Program introduced at the end of 1993 did not 
add anything new to previous legal acts except that it set the time limit: municipality was 
                                                 
23 Based on Leksin and Shvetsov (1999)  25
obliged to accept non-privatized social assets during six months after the acceptance of firm’s 
privatization plan. The adoption of privatization plan of a firm then in practice initiated the 
process of transfer of these assets to municipal ownership. Further problems and questions 
arising during the process of municipalization of social assets were solved through multiple 
minor acts issued by different government bodies at all levels of government and in some 
cases through courts.   
 
 Appendix 2. Data Description
24 
 
The results are based on a survey of 404 middle-sized and large manufacturing firms 
from 40 Russian regions in April-June 2003. In the survey we examined the extent of social 
service and infrastructure provision by the firms and the firms’ assessment of the quality of 
public infrastructure and the regulatory environment. Background information of ownership, 
investment, performance, competition, and financing decisions of the firms was also 
gathered. 
The source of information for the population of firms is the enterprise registry 
maintained by Goskomstat (State Committee of the Russian Federation on Statistics). In the 
construction of our sample we concentrated on the industrial sector, and within it 
manufacturing firms for which energy production is not a regular line of business. We set a 
minimum size limit of 400 employees, as pilot interview rounds indicated that smaller firms 
are unlikely to provide infrastructure or social services. Constructed in such a way, our 
sample frame contained 3523 firms. Our sampling technique includes a combination of 
clustering by region and systematic sampling by size. In the firms in our final sample, the 
general manager and the managers responsible for social and infrastructure affairs were 
interviewed face-to-face. Accounting information was left for self-fulfilling by the chief 
accountant. 
In our sample, compared to the population of Russian firms, the majority of industries 
are adequately represented in terms of the share of the firms, as are the federal districts. The 
fact that we surveyed medium and large enterprises explains the bias towards metallurgical 
firms regarding the distribution of industrial employment. The size distribution of our final 
sample is close to the population with the median establishment having 784 and average over 
1600 employees.  
Only 5 % of the firms in the sample are relatively new, as they were created during 
the 1990s. The majority of the firms in the sample are open joint stock companies, which is 
not surprising as most of the formerly state-owned firms were turned into open joint stock 
companies during the mass privatization of the early 1990s and some 80 % of the sampled 
firms were privatized during 1991-1994. Lastly, similar to many previous surveys, the sample 
contains some degree of selection bias towards the better-performing firms. 
In addition to the survey data, we use Goskomstat enterprise registry data on sales, 
profits, employment and capital to construct measures of industry-level concentration, labor 
market concentration, and firm performance measures.  We also use data on municipal 
budgets, and some municipal- and regional-level indicators. 
                                                 
24 For details see Haaparanta et al (2003)  26
Appendix 3 Description of Variables 
 
Variable name  Description 
  
log_emp1998  Logarithm of the number of employees in 1998 
  
Hous1990_per_employee  Tens of square meters of housing the firm had in 1990 per 
employee 
  
budget_assist  Dummy equal to 1 if firm received any budget assistance (such 
as subsidies and tax reductions) in the last three years 
  
state_sales2000  Share of sales to state sector in 2000 (takes values from 0 to 1) 
  
Munic_ownership  Share of municipal ownership stake (takes values from 0 to 1) 
  
Own_budget_income_share1999  Share of own revenues in total income of municipal budget in 
1999 (takes values from 0 to 1) 
  
Regulation_burden  Weeks of general manager’s working time spent in dealing 
with regulatory agencies in 2002 
  
State_capture  Dummy equal to 1 if firm admits its ability to influence laws 
and regulations at local or regional level 
  
HHI1990  Herfihdahl-Hirschman index for 5-digit industries in 1990 
  
Hous1990_per_emploee_weighted  Tens of square meters of housing the firm had in 1990 per 
employee, weighted by the time of transfer (the earlier 
transferred the smaller the weight) 
  
log_capital_emp2001  Logarithm of the ratio of capital to employment in 2001 
   
state_ownership  Share of state ownership stake (takes values from 0 to 1) 
  
inside_ownership  Share of insider (managers and workers) ownership stake 
(takes values from 0 to 1) 
  
Tax_share  Share of taxes the firm paid to municipality in 2002 to the total 
municipal budget income in 1999 (municipal data for later 
years is not yet available) 
  
Empl_share1998  Share of firm’s employment in the total industrial employment 
in municipality in 1998 (takes values from 0 to 1) 
  
HHI_labor_market1992  Herfihdahl-Hirschman index for the local labor market in 1992 
 
 